Michigan Law Review
Volume 96

Issue 6

1998

How Serious is the Threat of Impeachment? And to Whom?
Harold Baer Jr.
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Legal History Commons

Recommended Citation
Harold Baer Jr., How Serious is the Threat of Impeachment? And to Whom?, 96 MICH. L. REV. 1598 (1998).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol96/iss6/12

This Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

HOW SERIOUS IS THE THREAT OF
IMPEACHMENT? AND TO WHOM?
Harold Baer, Jr.*
THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS-A CONSTITUTIONAL AND
HISTORICAL ANALYSIS. By Michael J. Gerhardt. Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press. 1996. Pp. 233. $29.95.
U.S.

CONSTITUTION1
ARTICLE!

Section.2....The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker
and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.2
Section.3.... The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affir
mation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief
Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the
Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.3
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to
removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Of
fice of honor, Trust, or Profit under the United States: but the Party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgment, and Punishment, according to the Law.4

***
ARTICLE II
Section. 2.... [The President] shall have Power to grant Reprieves
and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases
of Impeachments

***
Section.4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the
United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and
* Hon. Harold Baer, Jr., is a United States District Court Judge for the Southern District
of New York. B.A. 1954, Hobart; LL.B. 1957, Yale. - Ed.
1. I have set out in detail the Articles and Sections of the U.S. Constitution that bear
directly on impeachment.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
4. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
5. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and
Misdemeanors.6
While a slender volume, The Federal Impeachment Process7 of

fers the reader a variety of different insights on this topic, beginning
with the debates at the Constitutional Convention and running to
the modem-day practice of impeachment trials by committee rather
than by the full senate. Impeachment is valuable reading, not just
for those of us interested in American history, or those of us who
are public officers of the United States, but for every American
who wants to understand his or her morning newspaper better. Not
only does it lift the veil of darkness surrounding the impeachment
process, it provides a focus for the perceptions of all those who are
concerned over the recent spate of impeachment threats.s
As Professor Gerhardt9 notes at the outset, impeachment was
not a major consideration at the Constitutional Convention. The
most prominent ratification document discussing the federal im
peachment process - and, of course, a series of other issues - was
The Federalist Papers (p. 12). The Federalist Papers provided an
overview of the model replicated by the convention - and the
model, it turns out, follows the impeachment procedures adopted
by the most populous states. The model has an unmistakable
theme often overlooked by some in Congress today, to say nothing
of President Clinton: that impeachment is an appropriate remedy
only where a public officer has committed a criminal act while in
office. Furthermore, the view of the Framers was that removal
from office and disqualification from holding future public office
was to be the only punishment. This is quite different from the pat
tern in England at the time, where not only were private citizens
subject to impeachment, but criminal penalties could and would be
imposed and by a bare majority of the House of Lords. Clearly the
Framers sought a uniquely American variation of the impeachment
process (pp. 4-5).
Professor Gerhardt has a writing style that enables the reader to
feel that he is sitting at a desk just behind the delegates, absorbing
the debate. He describes in some detail each of the various plans
that were put forth at the convention.
6. U.S. CoNST. art. II, § 4.
7. Hereinafter Impeachment.
8. Those threats may have escalated with a decision of mine involving an unlawful search
of an automobile here in New York and the suppression of some 80 pounds of heroin and
cocaine. See U.S. v. Bayless, 913 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), vacated on reconsideration,
921 F. Supp. 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). But it quickly escalated to include such respected mem
bers of the federal judiciary as Martha Craig Daughtrey of the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap
peals, and Judge Thelton Henderson of the Northern District of California, who preliminarily
enjoined California's affirmative action voter initiative among others.
9. Professor of Constitutional Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law; lecturer in Govern
ment, College of William and Mary.
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While the plans differed in several ways, the wrongdoing that
would constitute an impeachable offense was probably the most di
verse and included, at one time or another, malpractice, neglect of
duty, malversation and corruption before reaching, by an eight-to
three vote, the language, "bribery and other high crimes and misde
meanors." The author fails to note how treason crept into the final
language. He does note, however that it was not until August 1789
that a report was published advocating that the House of Repre
sentatives should have the sole power to impeach. Interestingly,
even at that late date, the report went on to provide that the trial
that followed impeachment by the House would occur before the
Supreme Court. As it turned out, "[t]he delegates ultimately
agreed that the Senate posed the fewest problems of the various
proposed trial courts. When the full convention voted on the Sen
ate as the trial body for impeachments, only Pennsylvania and Vir
ginia dissented from the proposal to make the Senate the 'sole'
court for impeachment trials" (p. 7). Perhaps most importantly for
academics and certainly for history buffs, we learn from Impeach
ment who was on each side of these significant issues and why.
WHO SHOULD BE IMPEACHED
One could not help but draw some parallels between the de
bates at the Constitutional Convention as to the officeholders to be
included in the impeachment orbit and the modem-day independ
ent counsel statute. In that statute, some seventy souls were finally,
and often after a painstaking review of hundreds of officeholders,
included amongst those men and women from the Executive
Branch subject to investigation by the special prosecutor. The
Framers, on the other hand, chose to paint with a broader brush:
they simply used the words "all civil Officers"10 - a phrase that has
wrought some havoc in the latter part of the 20th Century, at least
amongst constitutional scholars. We learn how this issue has been
defined and redefined by interpretation and history over the last
200 years. Clearly, the language targets the Executive Branch and
the Judicial Branch but, as Professor Gerhardt takes pains to note,
not the Legislative Branch (p. 76).
One cannot help but wonder why or whether the Framers be
lieved that oversight by the legislature was necessary to discipline
the Chief Executive and his appointees, including the judiciary, but
not the legislature itself. Perhaps the Senate thought, at least as to
judges, that life tenure and the requirement that there be no dimi
nution in compensation was of such importance as to require an
other branch of government to look after them. Hamilton believed
10. U.S. CONST.

art.

II, § 4.
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that these incidents of office alone would be sufficient to ensure
judicial independence and the omnipresent prospect of impeach
ment would not dampen that·independence (pp. 16-17). I wonder.
Yet Professor Gerhardt recounts how the impeachment of Senator
Blount of Tennessee initiated by John Adams provided the back
drop for a debate which culminated in the refusal of the Senate to
include its members within the reach of the impeachment net. In
stead, on July 8, 1797, the day after Senator Blount was impeached
by the House, the Senate expelled the Senator by a vote of twenty
five to one (p. 48). Ever since, the Senate has taken unto itself the
role of meting out any necessary discipline among its members.
The book is in large measure devoted to the impeachment pro
ceedings against the judiciary. The book chronicles at length almost
every judge ever subject to articles of impeachment by the House,
whether successful or not. In these chronicles, Gerhardt raises and
provides historical perspective on other provocative questions. For
instance, should it be fair gam� to indict and convict a federal judge
for criminal activity before impeachment or should impeachment
be the sole remedy by which to unseat ari Article III judge? Alex
ander Hamilton was prominent in this debate at the Convention.
His view, as expressed by Professor Gerhardt, was to the effect that:

The Constitution sets forth the grounds for impeaching the president
in a different place from its provision that every impeachable official,
including the president, is "liable and subject to Indictment, Trial,
Judgement, and Punishment, according to law." Yet, Hamilton read
this text as providing that a president would first be impeached and
removed from office and "would afterwards be liable to prosecution
and punishment in the courts of law." Given that the constitutional
convention delegates did not discuss the preferred order of impeach
ment and legal actions and that the Constitution does not state in so
many words that a president's liability at law should attach only after
he has left office, Hamilton's re�ding seems to have assumed its conclusion. [p. 16]
·

The language of the Constitution raises a variety of other similar
conundrums; another discussed at length by the author is the lan
guage that seemingly calls for the Vice President to preside at all
impeachment trials. If followed slavishly, it would, of course, leave
him or her to preside over his own .or her_ own impeachment trial.

IMPEACHMENT FOR

WHAT?.

For me, the most interesting theme throughout the volume is
the in-depth study of what "high crimes and misdemeanors" means
and how that meaning has changed froin the days of our country's
Founders. The change is highlighted by the background wrongs for
which those impeached, primarily judges, have been charged.
When all is said and done, one comes to the frightening realization
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that then-Representative Gerald Ford's remark that an impeach
ment offense is "whatever a majority of the House [considers it] to
be at a given moment in history," may hit the mark (p. 103). While
many may have believed, as the Framers did, that "high crimes and
misdemeanors" meant that some sort of criminal act was an essen
tial predicate for impeachment, this view may have deteriorated
over time into little more than a fantasy. History supports the
proposition that such a predicate has rarely been necessary and
makes the Ford pronouncement all the more real and all the more
frightening.
Take, for example, the plight of United States District Judge
John Pickering of New Hampshire. In 1803 he was the second of
ficeholder to be impeached under the Constitution. The vote was
forty-five to eight. The articles of impeachment charge him with
drunkenness and profanity on the bench. No criminal conduct was
alleged or proven. Indeed, his son argued he was too ill and so
incapable of exercising any sort of judgment as not to be a fit sub
ject for impeachment. The Senate voted llineteen to seven to con
vict and twenty to six to remove him from office (p. 50). While this
would appear to expand the "high crimes and misdemeanors" lan
guage of the Constitution beyond all bounds, that is just the
beginning.
If this sort of activity is truly what the Framers had in mind and few believe it was11 - impeachment of federal judges is no
more extraordinary and equally as fragile as the calumny practiced
by some city- and state-appointing authorities today. The city- and
state-level appointment and reappointment process may depend
less on merit and more on some assurance that the judge will follow
or has followed the appointing authority's political philosophy. Of
course such conduct cannot help but have a chilling effect on judi
cial independence. The author suggests that the impeachment and
conviction of Judge Pickering may have been aberrational and
occurred

"because the question of guilt was put in the form of asking senators
whether the judge stood guilty as charged, " rather than whether the
acts he allegedly committed constituted impeachable offenses. In
other words, the Senate's vote to convict may not reflect an acknowl
edgement by the Senate that violations of impeachable offenses were
actually involved. [p. 51]
While the author supports his argument by suggesting that Pick
ering was a Federalist judge and all nineteen votes to convict came
11. See, e.g., CliARLEs LUND BLACK, IMPEACHMENT 27-32 (1915); David P. Currie, The
Constitution in Congress: The Most Endangered Branch, 1801-1805, 33 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 219, 248 (1998); William L. Reynolds, Luther Martin, Maryland and the Constitution, 47
MD. L. REv. 291, 306-07 (1987). But cf. RAouL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITU
TIONAL PROBLEMS 56-57, 184-85 (1973).
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from the Republican majority (p. 51), it provides cold comfort for
those who maintain that for judicial independence to thrive, party
labels must be discarded following election or appointment.
WHO

MAy

IMPEACH

Another area of concern and exploration by Professor Gerhardt
is the recent trend toward impeachment by committee. This ap
proach lacks, at least at the outset, involvement by the whole Sen
ate. Some agree, with at least superficial merit, that this is another
constitutionally infirm approach but it is within the Rules of Proce
dure & Practice promulgated by the Senate. The infirmity, as the
author points out, is that language in the Constitution which dic
tates that an impeachment trial be broughr-before the whole Senate
(pp. 116-17).
Central to the Senate's adoption in the 1980's of a committee
system for impeachment proceedings is the ever-increasing business
of the Senate and the time impeachment trials take away from that
business. This also accounts for the decreasing attendance by Sena
tors at such trials (pp. 34-35). Of course, there are other concerns
that have contributed to the decreased number of trials; they in
clude the ever-changing complexion of Congress with the attendant
frequent leadership changes. These changes, if they find the oppo
sition in power and the public official allied with them politically,
may result in a slowing of the process. The new approach designat
ing twelve senators as a special trial committee to hear and report,
utilized in connection with the three impeachment trials in the
1980's, obviates all these problems to a greater or lesser extent.
This approach is as follows:
The committee prepares a transcript of the entire hearings before it, a
neutral statement of the facts, and a summary of the evidence that the
parties have introduced on the contested issues of fact. Neither the
transcript nor the summary contains any recommendation from the
trial committee as to the impeached official's guilt or innocence. [p.
34 ]

Interestingly, one or more of those three impeachment proceed
ings followed a criminal trial, a conviction· and an affirmance by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. Assuming that Congress uses its power
in accordance with its Constitutional mandate or what appears to
be its Constitutional mandate, i.e., impeachment for "high crimes
and misdemeanors," awaiting the outcome of criminal charges
makes the committee approach even more reasonable. This is so
because once proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been estab
lished it is less important that such proof be provided first hand to
100 senators. While testimony is taken before less than the full Sen
ate, the transcript is made available to all Senators. Should it reach
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the stage where the Senate votes on the articles or charges, the full
Senate participates.

THE WAGES OF IMPEACHMENT
We might ask what happens to those who are impeached and
found guilty by the Senate. Professor Gerhardt points out at least
one fact that has garnered far less attention than it deserves: that
the Senate has the opportunity not only to convict or acquit but also
upon conviction to disqualify the civil officer from ever holding fu
ture public office. While this seems perfectly reasonable, the fact is
that it does not always happen. Perhaps because it requires two
separate and distinct votes by the Senate. From time to time, there
have been impeachments without disqualification and the im
peached officeholder remains competent to occupy yet another po
sition of public trust. An example of this failure to act by the
Senate resulted in the impeachment a decade ago, and the subse
quent election to Congress in 1992 of Judge Alcee Hastings.
Although impeached for bribe-taking, he is now at work as an influ
ential Congressman, having been elected every two years thereafter
(pp. 60-61) .
The book is filled with other allied revelations. Another con
cern regarding punishment is the result of incomplete impeachment
proceedings - a point worth recounting, especially in light of our
avowedly budget-conscious Congress. Failing initiation (to say
nothing of completion) of impeachment proceedings, an office
holder may - even after a felony convictiion and exhaustion of all
appeals - continue to draw his or her full salary and all attendant
raises, COLAs, etc. There may be, according to the author, incar
cerated Article III judges who continued to draw full pay due to
unfinished impeachment proceedings (p. 172) .

CONCLUSION
Many of those who take the time to read this book will regard it
as simply providing a valuable analysis of the way the Framers ap
proached the impeachment process, how it was employed over the
last 200 years, and the more recent changes in procedure. For some
federal judges, and to an extent some state judges, it says much
more. For those who believe there is a world of difference between
appropriately protected criticism of a judicial decision and a threat
by Congress or the President to initiate impeachment proceedings
against the judge who wrote it, this volume shrinks that world.
In a very real way, although not likely uppermost in the author's
mind, Impeachment provides a glimpse into the fragility of our form
of government. At least from my vantage point as a federal judge,
it suggests that of the three equal branches of government, one, the
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judicial branch, may be less equal than the others. Put another way,
if judicial independence is to remain a mainstay of our form of gov
ernment, it will require constant vigilance.

